We investigate how the U.S. withdrawal and the amendments of the Bonn climate policy conference in 2001 will change the economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol in its original form. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model, we find that U.S. withdrawal together with the new provisions of Bonn are likely to reduce environmental effectiveness to zero. U.S. compliance under the new Bonn amendments would accommodate a substantial cut in global emissions at small compliance costs for OECD countries raising some hopes that the U.S. might rejoin the Kyoto Protocol during the next years.
Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated in 1997, requires industrialized countries to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). In its original version, the Protocol was supposed to cut down the GHG emissions of the industrialized countries during the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] by an average of 5.2 % below their 1990 levels. The agreement will not enter into force, however, until it has been ratified by at least 55 countries, and these ratifying countries must have contributed at least 55 percent of the industrialized world's CO 2 emissions (the most important GHG) in 1990.
In March 2001, the U.S., under President Bush, declared its withdrawal from the Protocol reasoning that the costs to the U.S. economy would be too high and exemption of developing countries from binding emission targets would not be acceptable. 1 The U.S. withdrawal triggered a discussion among the remaining industrialized countries about whether or not to implement the Protocol in the absence of the U.S. The EU declared itself leader in a strategy of ratification without the U.S., but -in addition to EU approval -entering into force of the Protocol requires ratification by Japan, the Former Soviet Union (Russia and Ukraine) as well as Eastern Europe to get the necessary quorum. Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe were assumed to ratify, since they expect larger revenues from selling surplus emission rights.
2 Japan confirmed its interest to keep alive the treaty bearing the name of its imperial city. However, it also stressed that the Protocol would make sense only if the U.S. -as the world's biggest polluter -would carry out the treaty.
In this context, delegates from 180 countries met in Bonn during July 2001, most of them determined to rescue the Kyoto global warming treaty from collapsing after a decade of negotiations. The negotiating parties agreed on a compromise paper which demanded numerous concessions, especially by the EU. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and Russia were allowed a substantial credit for carbon dioxide sinks, namely forests and agricultural soils that store the greenhouse gas. The latter is supposed to considerably water down the provisions of the Protocol as originally agreed in 1997. Moreover, the restrictive position held by the EU with respect to the permissible scope of emissions trading between 1 In 1997, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which makes "meaningful" participation of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for ratification. Given that U.S. ratification requires a 2/3 majority in the Senate, the prospects for ratification have been rather small over the years, irrespective of the latest move under the Bush administration.
2 Under the Kyoto Protocol, Eastern Europe, Ukraine and, particularly, Russia received much higher emission entitlements than they are expected to emit under business-as-usual between 2008 -2012 (see e.g. Paltsev 2000 . They will sell their excessive emission rights if industrialized countries can trade emission rights among each other to minimize overall costs of abatement.
industrialized countries is no longer held up. The latest version of the Kyoto Protocol does not foresee any concrete caps on the share of emissions reductions a country can meet through the purchase of permits from other industrialized countries, nor does it envision a cap on the amount of permits it can sell. 3 In fact, this means that Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe will be able to sell all their surplus emission permits -usually referred to as hot air -which may significantly increase the effective emissions under the Kyoto Protocol as compared to strictly domestic action. 4 There is meanwhile an extensive literature providing quantitative evidence on the economic effects of the Kyoto Protocol (see Weyant 1999 or UNEP 2001 for summary reports). However, this literature does not incorporate the most recent substantial changes in international climate politics, i.e. the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the provisions of the Bonn conference on sink credits.
The objective of this paper is to assess how the U.S. withdrawal and the amendments of the Bonn conference will change the economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol in its original form. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, our key findings can be summarized as follows:
(i) Non-compliance of the U.S. reduces environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol practically to zero if there are no restrictions to emission sales from Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe. In this case, the demand for emission permits of remaining OECD countries is sufficiently small to drive down the price of permits almost to zero given the large supply of surplus emission rights from Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe. In short, Kyoto more or less boils down to business-as-usual without binding emission constraint.
(ii) Restrictions to emissions trading in order to avoid hot air makes global abatement for non-U.S. OECD countries rather costly. For strictly domestic abatement, the reduction in global emissions only amounts to a third of the value that would be achieved for 3 It has been agreed that the use of emissions trading "shall be supplemental to domestic action and domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party .... to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments ..." (UNFCCC 2001) . The undefined term "significant" gives sufficient leeway for comprehensive trading. 4 The effects of restrictions on permit imports and exports have been examined more recently in Bernstein et al. (1999) , Bollen et al. (1999) , Criqui et al. (1999) , Böhringer (2000) , and Ellerman and Wing (2000) .
U.S. compliance, whereas total costs for abating OECD countries would remain roughly the same.
(iii) Monopolistic permit supply by Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe may suppress a larger share of hot air and halve compliance costs of abating OECD countries as compared to strictly domestic action. However, environmental effectiveness falls too, leading to a global emission reduction of only 1 % as compared to business-as-usual.
(iv) Under U.S. compliance, adoption of sink credits together with unrestricted emissions trading, accommodates very small compliance costs for OECD while global emissions would still fall by roughly 4 %. The consumption loss to U.S. seems small enougharound 0.25 % of the business-as-usual consumption level -to justify hopes that the U.S. might rejoin the Kyoto Protocol during the next years.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in key model assumptions (such as fossil fuel price responsiveness, ease of substitution among traded non-energy goods, or baseline projections for economic and emission growth) confirm the robustness of the above results.
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Nevertheless, several caveats apply which may be addressed in future research once the relevant information and data is available: First, our analysis does not cover a further commitment period after 2012 that might influence behavior in the first commitment (e.g. through banking of emission permits). Second, we assume for the case of U.S. withdrawal that the U.S. will not undertake any domestic policies to cut GHG emissions. Third, no other greenhouse gas besides CO 2 is incorporated in our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief nontechnical summary of the underlying modeling framework. Section 3 entails a description of the policy scenarios. Section 4 presents the interpretation of simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
Analytical Framework and Baseline Calibration
Carbon abatement policies not only cause direct adjustments on fossil fuel markets, but they produce indirect spillovers to other markets that, in turn, feed back to the economy. General equilibrium provides a consistent framework for studying price-dependent interactions between the energy system and the rest of the economy. The simultaneous explanation of the origin and the spending of income of the economic agents makes it possible to address both economy-wide efficiency as well as equity implications of abatement policy interference.
Therefore, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have become a standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (Bergmann 1990 , Grubb et al. 1993 , Weyant 1999 ).
For our analysis, we use a static 7-sector, 12-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy. The choice of sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of carbon abatement such as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The regional aggregation covers the Annex-B parties as well as major non-Annex-B regions that are central to the greenhouse gas issue. As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the model is based on economic transactions in a particular benchmark year. Benchmark data determine parameters of the (nested CES) functional forms from a given set of benchmark quantities, prices, and elasticities (see Table A .1 for a summary of values of key elasticities). As to benchmark quantities and prices, we employ the GTAP 4 database (McDougall 1997) supplemented by OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for the year 1995 as described in Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) .
The magnitude and distribution of abatement costs associated with the implementation of the Kyoto emission constraints crucially depend on the business-as-usual (BAU) projections for GDP, fuel prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. (see e.g. Böhringer et al. (2000) ). In our comparative-static framework, we infer the BAU economic structure of the model's regions for the year 2010 using most recent projections on the economic development and future fossil fuel production. 6 The forward calibration of the 1995 economies to 2010
incorporates exogenous information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE 1998) for GDP growth, energy demand and future energy prices. The fossil fuel production functions are finally calibrated to be consistent with exogenous estimates for supply elasticities.
Policy Scenarios
The set of scenarios reflects alternative options for implementing the Kyoto Protocol along three important dimensions of climate change policy, which are laid out in the following.
A. Reduction Requirements
The Kyoto Protocol fixes GHG emission limits for industrialized countries as listed in Annex B of the Protocol. In our simulations we consider two different schemes of emission reduction targets:
OLD Option OLD considers a reduction target of 5.2 % on average for industrialized countries which the Kyoto Protocol originally aspired to.
NEW
Option NEW accounts for the compromise as agreed on in Bonn where significant credits for carbon dioxide sinks where allowed. Countries can offset some of the CO 2 stored in their forests and farmlands to meet their emission limits.
6 Simulation results for emission abatement scenarios are then measured with respect to the BAU situation in 2010 (see section 4). 
B. Scope of Emissions Trading
The Bonn compromise does not set clear limits on the magnitude of international emissions trading that the industrialized countries could engage in to achieve their targets. The scope of permissible emissions trading has been a major point of disagreement between the U.S. and the EU. The EU wanted nations to make at least half of their emissions cuts within their own borders, whereas the U.S. wanted no limit on the purchase of emission rights from other countries.
In our simulations, we capture extreme points on the extent to which countries can meet their specific emission reduction commitments by abatement abroad (so-called whereflexibility Protocol change depending on the involvement of the U.S. We therefore take into account two options which deliver a useful angle of comparison:
USin Option "USin" assumes that the U.S. will keep with its Kyoto commitment.
USout
Option "USout" reflects the current situation of U.S. climate policy in assuming that the USA will not be part of the Kyoto Protocol. Table 3 summarizes the set of core scenarios that result from the combination of policy options as laid out above. 
Simulation Results
The economic previous studies (see Weyant 1999 and UNEP 2001) .
A. Compliance of the U.S. -No Emissions Trading
We start discussion of simulation results for the scenarios USin_NTR_OLD and USin_NTR_NEW where the U.S. meets its Kyoto targets (in the OLD or NEW version) and reduction commitments are met exclusively by domestic action of Annex B countries. Table 4 Most important are changes on international fuel markets for crude oil, gas and coal.
The cutback in global demand for fossil fuels implies a significant drop of their prices providing economic gains to fossil fuel importers and losses to fossil fuel exporters. These fossil fuel market effects explain most of the welfare impacts for non-abating countries. The economic implications of international price changes on non-energy markets are more complex. Higher energy costs raise the prices of non-energy goods (in particular energyintensive goods) produced in abating countries. Countries that import these goods suffer from higher prices to the extent that they can not substitute away towards cheaper imports of nonabating countries. The ease of substitution not only determines the implicit burden shifting via non-energy exports from abating countries but also the extent to which non-abating countries achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis abating exporters. The gain in market shares due to substitution effects may be partially offset by an opposite scale effect: Due to reduced economic activity and income, import demand by the group of abating countries (here: Annex B) declines, and this exerts a downward pressure on the export prices of non-abating countries.
Adoption of the less stringent emission targets as adopted in Bonn reduces welfare costs of the Annex B group by more than 25 % -the adjustment costs to OECD countries, however, remain substantial.
With respect to environmental effectiveness, domestic abatement by Annex B countries implies a global reduction of carbon emission by 9 % (OLD) or 7.9 % (NEW) compared to BAU. Leakage, which is mainly caused by increased fossil fuel demand of nonabating countries and shifts in the pattern of energy-intensive trade, amounts to more than 10%.
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B. Withdrawal of the U.S. -No Emissions Trading
Next, we move to the economic and environmental implications of U.S. withdrawal for the NTR cases, which are reported in Table 5 . At the single-region level, the induced consumption changes as compared to the case of U.S. compliance illustrates the importance of terms-oftrade effects. EUR and JPN are worse off because international fuel prices under U.S.
withdrawal are not depressed as much and, therefore, terms-of-trade gains for fuel importers decrease. The latter effect becomes even more obvious for non-abating developing countries IDI and ASI. Fuel exporters such as CAN, FSU, MPC or ROW, on the other hand, do better.
The key message of Table 5 , however, is that U.S. withdrawal dramatically reduces costeffectiveness of global emission reduction. Total costs for remaining Annex B countries slightly increase while global emission reduction drops by a factor of 3 as compared to the scenario where the U.S. would not drop out.
11 10 A leakage rate of 10 % implies that non-abating countries offset a tenth of the carbon reduction achieved in abating countries. (Böhringer and Vogt 2001) , the dilemma from a political economy point of view becomes obvious. Besides, the USout_NTR-scenarios would also appear rather unfair to voters in abating non-U.S. OECD countries, since they have to bear substantial welfare costs while the U.S economy remains basically unaffected.
But not only acceptance in remaining OECD countries seems unrealistic. Independent of U.S. withdrawal, FSU wouldn't like any scenario without emissions trading because then it would face overall consumption losses due to negative terms-of-trade effects (in particular with respect to its gas and oil export revenues). In this context, it should be noted that the U.S.
position has an important impact on the potential bargaining power of the FSU.
If the U.S. forms part of the abatement coalition, the issue of FSU-compliance won't matter at all for the NTR cases -neither in economic terms nor in environmental terms (FSU doesn't abate anyway!). However, U.S. withdrawal gives FSU a key leverage to achieve concessions from the remaining Annex-B countries: Without the U.S., the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol requires acceptance by FSU, because otherwise ratifying countries would not contribute at least 55 % of the industrialized world's CO 2 emissions in 1990.
Obviously, one key demand on behalf of FSU will be Annex B emissions trading without constraints from third parties on its permissible level of carbon exports.
C. Withdrawal of the U.S. -Emissions Trading
This leads us to the final set of core scenarios in which we consider the consequences of permit trading. As an outcome of the Bonn conference there are no (clear) limits on the extent to which one Annex B country can meet its reduction commitment by purchasing emission rights from other Annex B countries. Tables 6 and 7 show the implications of unconstrained Annex B emissions trading, which -after Bonn -appears as a very realistic option.
Full Annex B trading reduces the aggregate Annex B costs of implementing Kyoto dramatically due to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across regions. All OECD countries benefit substantially from purchasing cheap emission abatement in CEA and FSU.
However, welfare costs for USA, CAN and AUN are still non-negligible in the scenarios in which the U.S. sticks to its Kyoto commitment. With relaxed Kyoto targets (NEW), the permit price even hits zero, as the demand of remaining Annex-B countries is small relative to the supply of surplus emission rights from FSU and CEA. While U.S. withdrawal and unconstrained Annex B emissions trading sounds like good news from the aggregate cost side, the environmental effectiveness is more or less zero. To put it differently, Kyoto comes at no costs because the world economy and its emissions develop as in business-as-usual.
D. Monopolistic Permit Supply
Competitive behavior of FSU and CEA on the permit market may seem somewhat implausible for the case in which the international permit price falls to zero and emission sales therefore do not create any revenue. What will happen if these countries behave as monopolists restricting their supply in order to drive up the international carbon price? As a shortcut, we mimic such a behavior by imposing caps on emission right exports from FSU and CEA. Concretely, we assume that export quotas for FSU and CEA will be 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, ..., 90%, and 100% of the difference between their business-as-usual emissions and their emission entitlements after the Bonn updates. We have also listed the results for the scenario USout_NTR_NEW to accommodate the direct comparison with the NTR case. Column "0" of Table 8 captures a situation in which FSU and CEA will not export any emission rights but intra-OECD emissions trading takes place. The latter cuts down compliance costs for the OECD aggregate by nearly 15 % without loss of environmental effectiveness as compared to the no-emission-trading case (USout_NTR_NEW).
Comparison of regional welfare between USout_NTR_NEW and the Column "0"
indicates that emissions trading does not lead to a Pareto improvement. This is a clear instance of terms-of-trade effects: Although it is known that -in the absence of second-best effects -emissions trading must improve global efficiency, there is no guarantee -a priorithat every region will benefit from emissions trading. The reason behind this ambiguity are changes in the terms of trade which -contrary to the wide-spread partial equilibrium approach in environmental policy analysis -are taken into account in our general equilibrium framework.
When FSU and CEA sell hot air, the international price of carbon permits as well as total OECD compliance costs fall towards larger amounts of hot air exports. Column "100" of Table 8 , where FSU and CEA sell off total hot air, coincides with the scenario USout_TRD_NEW in Table 6 with a permit price of zero and no changes as compared to BAU. Neither of the two extreme cases is attractive for FSU and CEA because they can not capitalize on sales of emission rights.
The numerical results indicate that FSU would aim at restricting permits sales at 40 % of hot air in order to maximize welfare. 13 In this case, OECD costs and global emission reduction drop roughly to half the value that arises for exclusive intra-OECD emissions trading. Table 8 illustrates the potential trade-offs between environmental effectiveness and total costs of OECD compliance on the one hand, as well as burden sharing between OECD and FSU/CEA on the other hand.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated different scenarios for implementing the Kyoto Protocol combining alternative options along three important policy dimensions: U.S. compliance versus U.S. withdrawal, domestic action versus unrestricted Annex B emissions trading, and the original Kyoto targets versus the relaxed targets of Bonn.
Our results clearly indicate that U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol implies a dramatic reduction in environmental effectiveness. If emission trading among remaining Annex-B countries becomes more or less unrestricted, which seems to be rather likely after the Bonn outcome, the reduction of global carbon emissions as compared to BAU will fall to zero. The reason is that supply of surplus emission rights from Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe is large relative to the demand from OECD countries other than the U.S., driving down the permit price close to zero (if Kyoto targets had not been relaxed for sink credits) or to zero (if Kyoto targets are updated with sink credits).
If remaining OECD countries would opt for strictly domestic action in order to prevent hot air, global carbon emissions could be reduced by 2.7 % (with sink credits) or 3.1 % (without sink credits). However, the global emission cutback would then only amount to roughly a third of the value that could be achieved for U.S. compliance while remaining OECD countries would suffer more or less the same non-negligible adjustment costs. Implicit willingness-to-pay, thus, would have to triple in these countries. Such a policy appears rather unacceptable to citizens in non-U.S. OECD countries -not only with regard to overall costeffectiveness but also with respect to fairness considerations.
Monopolistic permit supply by Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe may suppress a larger share of hot air and halve compliance costs of abating OECD countries as compared to strictly domestic action. However, environmental effectiveness falls too, with a global emission reduction around 1 % for the revised Kyoto targets.
Policy makers have welcomed the outcome of the Bonn climate negotiations as a decisive breakthrough in international climate politics. The environmental effects can not be the reason for celebration: Sink credits, hot air through emissions trading and, in particular, the continued U.S. withdrawal will make Kyoto ineffective in environmental terms.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that -even without any effective emission cutback -the ratification of Kyoto is crucial for the further policy process of climate protection. Failure might have thrown back the efforts to climate protection by several years. Hopes remain that the U.S. might rejoin the Protocol under the new conditions. Compliance costs to the U.S. economy seem rather moderate, which could enhance the domestic U.S. political pressure in favor of coordinated international abatement. Starting from a ratified Kyoto Protocol, it will be also much easier to achieve effective GHG emission reduction in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. 
where Π denotes the profit functions, C the cost functions which relate the minimum possible total costs of producing Y to the positive input prices, technology parameters, and the output quantity Y, and p and w are the prices for goods and factors, respectively.
Production of each good takes place according to constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions, which exhibit constant returns to scale. Therefore, the output price equals the per-unit cost in each sector, and firms make zero profits in equilibrium (Euler's Theorem). Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies the equilibrium condition:
where c and π are the unit cost and profit functions, respectively.
Demand functions for goods and factors can be derived by Shepard's Lemma. It suggests that the first-order differentiation of the cost function with respect to an input price yields the cost-minimizing demand function for the corresponding input. Hence, the intermediate demand for good j in sector i is:
and the demand for factor f in sector i is:
The profit functions posses a corresponding derivative property (Hotelling's Lemma):
The variable, price dependent input coefficients, which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions, are thus: 
The model captures the production of commodities by aggregate, hierarchical (or nested) constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions that characterize the technology through substitution possibilities between capital, labor, energy and material (nonenergy) intermediate inputs (KLEM) . Two types of production functions are employed: those for fossil fuels (in our case v = COL, CRU, GAS) and those for non-fossil fuels (in our case n = EIS, ELE, OIL, ROI). 
with σ KLE = 1/(1-ρ KLE ) the elasticity of substitution between energy and the primary factor aggregate and θ the input (Leontief) coefficient. Finally, at the third level, capital and labor factor inputs trade-off with a constant elasticity of substitution 
As to the formation of the energy aggregate E, we employ several levels of nesting to represent differences in substitution possibilities between primary fossil fuel types as well as substitution between the primary fossil fuel composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
The energy aggregate is a CES composite of electricity and primary energy inputs FF with
at the top nest:
The primary energy composite is defined as a CES function of coal and the composite of refined oil and natural gas with elasticity σ COA = 1/(1-ρ COA ). The oil-gas composite is assumed to have a simple Cobb-Douglas functional form with value shares given by θ :
( ) 
[10]
Figure A.1: Nesting structure of non-fossil fuel production Fossil fuel resources v are modeled as graded resources. The structure of production of fossil fuels is given in Figure A. 2. It is characterized by the presence of a fossil fuel resource in fixed supply. All inputs, except for the sector-specific resource R, are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. Mine managers minimize production costs subject to the technology constraint: 
The resource grade structure is reflected by the elasticity of substitution between the fossil fuel resource and the capital-labor-energy-material aggregate in production. The substitution elasticity between the specific factor and the Leontief composite at the top level is
). This substitution elasticity is calibrated in consistency with an exogenously given supply elasticity of fossil fuel ε vr according to We now turn to the derivation of the factor demand functions for the nested CES production functions, taking into account the duality between the production function and the cost function The total cost function that reflects the same production technology as the CES production function for e.g. value added KL in non-fossil fuel production given by [8] 
where PK and PL are the per-unit factor costs for the industry including factor taxes if applicable. The price function for the value-added aggregate at the third level is:
In order to determine the variable input coefficient for capital and labor a nr 
with θ nr the KLE value share in total production. The variable input coefficient for e.g.
labor is then: 
A.2 Households
In each region, private demand for goods and services is derived from utility maximization of a representative household subject to a budget constraint given by the income level INC. The agent is endowed with the supplies of the primary factors of production (natural resources used for fossil fuel production, labor and capital) and tax revenues. In our comparative-static framework, overall investment demand is fixed at the reference level. The household's problem is then:
where W is the welfare of the representative household in region r, d denotes the final demand for commodities, k is the aggregate factor endowment of the representative agent and TR are total tax revenues. Household preferences are characterized by a CES utility function.
As in production, the maximization problem in 
where the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy composites is
given by σ C = 1/(1-ρ C ), the elasticity of substitution within the fossil fuel aggregate by σ FE = 1/(1-ρ FE ), and θ j are the value shares in non-fossil fuel consumption. The structure of final demand is presented in Figure A with C the aggregate household consumption in region r and PC its associated price. On the output side, two types of differentiated goods are produced as joint products for sale in the domestic markets and the export markets, respectively. The allocation of output between domestic sales D and international sales X is characterized by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. Hence, firms maximize profits subject to the constraint:
with σ tr = 1/(1 + η) the transformation elasticity.
Regarding imports, the standard Armington convention is adopted in the sense that Given an emission constraint producers as well as consumers must pay this price on the emissions resulting from the production and consumption processes. Revenues coming from the imposition of the carbon constraint are given to the representative agent. The total cost of Armington inputs in production and consumption that reflects the CES production technology in [25] but takes CO2 emission restrictions into account is:
with a i the carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i and τ the shadow price of CO 2 in region r associated with the carbon emission restriction: is the endowment of carbon emission rights in region r.
A.5 Zero Profit and Market Clearance Conditions
The equilibrium conditions in the model are zero profit and market clearance conditions. Zero profit conditions as derived in [2] require that no producer earns an "excess" profit in equilibrium. The value of inputs per unit activity must be equal to the value of outputs. The zero profit conditions for production, using the variable input coefficient derived above, is: An equilibrium is characterized by a set of prices in the different goods and factor markets such that the zero profit and market clearance conditions stated above hold. Table A .1 provides a summary of elasticity values adopted for the core simulations. 
A.6 Overview of Elasticities
